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THE SWAPS PUSHOUT RULE: MUCH ADO ABOUT THE WRONG THING? 
 
John Crawford and Tim Karpoff 
 
     
A notably bitter battle over financial reform in the wake of the crisis of 2008 has 
centered on a mandate that federally insured depository institutions—i.e., banks—refrain 
from entering into certain derivatives contracts.
1
 The mandate was included as a provi-
sion of the Dodd-Frank Act and prohibited banks from entering into particular types of 
“swaps,” or contracts in which parties promise to pay each other based on defined events 
such as a bond default.
2
 The prohibition was popularly known as the Swaps Pushout Rule 
(the “Rule”). Bank holding companies (BHCs) could continue to transact in these instru-
ments, but had to do so out of different legal entities, such as broker-dealers.
3
 Several of 
the largest financial institutions in the United States recently led a successful lobbying 
effort to roll back the Rule—which had not yet taken effect—so that banks can continue 
to enter into the vast majority of these swaps.
4
 The Rule’s rollback has inspired intense 
criticism, but the critiques have not accurately reflected what is really at stake for the 
                                                 

 Associate Professor, University of California, Hastings College of Law.  

 Partner, Jenner & Block; Counsel to the Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 
2009–2012; Director, United States Department of the Treasury’s Office of Financial Institutions Policy, 
2012–2014. 
1
 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 
716, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act] (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8305) (amended 2014).  
2
 Id. 
3
 Section 3(a)(4) of the Securities Act of 1934 defines a broker as a person or entity “engaged in the 
business of effecting transactions in securities for the accounts of others,” and Section 3(a)(5) defines a 
dealer as a person or entity “engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his own account.” 
Securities Act § 3(a). Most major firms engaged in brokering and dealing do both, and are routinely 
referred to as “broker-dealers.” Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1934) (amended 2012). 
4
 See Text of House Amendment to Senate Amendment to H.R. 83 at 615–18 (2014), 
http://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20141208/CPRT-113-HPRT-RU00-HR83sa.pdf. A comparison of the 
amended provision to the original Rule can be found at 
http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/DFA_Section_716.pdf.   
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banks or the public. The Rule was sold as an anti-bailout measure;
5
 however, this Article 
argues that the Rule would have been ineffective as a means to prevent bailouts of the 
largest, most complex BHCs—those that deal in these swaps. The Rule does, however, 
matter for prudential regulatory purposes—just not for the reasons put forward by crit-
ics.
6
 What matters is not whether swaps are booked at a BHC subsidiary that enjoys for-
mal access to the federal safety net,
7
 but rather the size of the loss-absorbing capital 
“buffer” the BHC must use to fund its swap positions. It turns out that the size of the re-
quired buffer for the swap may vary depending on the legal entity in which it is booked.
8
 
This has important implications for what the appropriate response to the rollback should 
be.
 
 
This Article explains the practical impact of the Rule and its rollback—an essential 
step to informing further regulatory efforts. Part I provides a detailed description of the 
Rule, and Part II explains why the notion that it would have prevented bailouts is mis-
guided. Part III explores possible reasons the systemically important BHCs (SIBs) that 
dominate the market in the relevant swaps lobbied for the rollback.
9
 We argue that the 
principal reason SIBs care about the Rule is that the relevant swaps are subject to differ-
ent capital charges based on whether they are booked in the SIBs’ bank or non-bank sub-
sidiaries.
10
 Put simply, it costs more to fund these swaps if they are booked at a broker-
dealer rather than at a bank.  
 
                                                 
5
 Senator Elizabeth Warren, for example, declared that the rollback would put “taxpayers right back 
on the hook for bailing out big banks.” See, e.g., ‘Enough is enough’: Elizabeth Warren launches fiery 
attack after Congress weakens Wall Street regs, WONKBLOG, Dec. 12, 2014, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/12/12/enough-is-enough-elizabeth-warrens-
fiery-attack-comes-after-congress-weakens-wall-street-regulations/. 
6
 It is important to note that the rollback was criticized based on process as well as substance: some 
saw it as evidence of unhealthy influence by big banks. See id. Our focus, however, is exclusively on the 
substance of the Rule. 
7
 This “safety net” consists of deposit insurance and access to emergency lending from the Federal 
Reserve. 
8
 See infra Part III. 
9
 Five SIBs account for 95% of the market in swaps dealing: JPMorgan Chase & Co., Citigroup Inc., 
Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Bank of America Corporation, and Morgan Stanley. See John Carney, Ratings 
Game Behind Big Banks’ Derivatives Play, WALL ST. J., (Dec. 12, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/ratings-game-behind-big-banks-derivatives-play-heard-on-the-street-
1418417119?cb=logged0.08315180937852862. We restrict our analysis in this Article to SIBs because 
they dominate the market, were most active in pushing for the rollback, and have been the focus of 
criticism and “bailout” fears. If smaller banks’ market share of swaps dealing grew, it might affect one’s 
view of the appropriate regulatory response. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.  
10
 See infra Part III.  
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I. The Rule  
The Dodd-Frank Act was drafted in an environment of widespread public anger 
about the bailouts that occurred during the financial crisis; the Act promised, inter alia, to 
“end ‘too big to fail’ [and] to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts.”11 The 
Rule was written as a provision of the Dodd-Frank Act and purported to serve this end. 
As drafted, the Rule would have prohibited insured depository institutions from entering 
only certain swap contracts: uncleared credit default swaps (CDS);
12
 most types of equity 
swaps;
13
 and swaps referencing most physical commodities.
14
 These swaps were forbid-
den only to the degree that they did not aim to mitigate risks assumed in other (permissi-
ble) parts of the bank’s portfolio.15 Interest rate swaps16 and foreign exchange swaps17—
which in aggregate represent the vast majority of SIBs’ swap portfolios in terms of mar-
ket value
18—would not have been subject to the Rule. 
It is important to emphasize that while the Rule would have pushed the swaps out 
of the SIB’s bank subsidiary, it would not have pushed the swaps out of the SIB entirely; 
the swaps would have remained permissible if they were simply migrated to an affiliate 
entity in the same SIB’s holding company.19 Figure 1 illustrates a typical SIB structure, 
consisting of a parent holding company atop an array of operational subsidiaries, includ-
                                                 
11
 Dodd-Frank Act pmbl. 
12
 For a description of CDS, see infra Part III. Uncleared swaps exclude swaps “cleared by a 
derivatives clearing organization . . . or a clearing agency . . . that is registered, or exempt from 
registration, as a derivatives clearing organization under the Commodity Exchange Act or as a clearing 
agency under the Securities Exchange Act, respectively.” Dodd-Frank § 716(d)(3). 
13
 An example of an equity swap is one in which party A makes fixed payments to party B in 
exchange for payments that mimic the return on a particular corporation’s stock. 
14
 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 716, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8305). 
Note that swaps based on precious metals have always been exempt from the Rule. 
15
 Id.  
16
 In an interest rate swap, parties exchange different interest payments on a notional principal 
amount. One party will usually pay a fixed rate and the other party a floating rate. See, e.g., The valuation 
of US Dollar interest rate swaps, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS (Jan. 1993), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/econ35.htm. 
17
 A foreign exchange swap involves the exchange of principal and interest in one currency for 
principal and interest in another currency; it is typically used by firms trying to “lock in” the value in 
currency A’s terms of future payments due to them in currency B. See, e.g., The basic mechanics of FX 
swaps and cross-currency basis swaps, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS (Sept. 2008), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0803z.htm. 
18
 See BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements, 141 (June 2015), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1506.pdf. 
19
 As noted above, the Rule is different in this respect from the Volcker Rule, which forbids 
proprietary trading throughout the entire SIB. 
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ing banks and broker-dealers.
20
 What was at stake with the Rule, therefore, was not 
whether JPMorgan Chase & Co. (a holding company) could enter swap agreements, but 
rather which of its subsidiaries would house the swaps: JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (an 
insured depository, or bank) or J.P. Morgan Securities LLC (a broker-dealer). 
Figure 1: Illustrative SIB Holding Company
21
 
 
As noted, the Rule was part of a legislative effort to end bailouts; the central plank 
of this effort was the creation of a mechanism to resolve failing financial institutions 
without the commitment of taxpayer funds.
22
 The legislation left in place, however, an 
explicit promise by the federal government to “bail out” bank depositors (subject to an 
account-based cap) in the event of bank failure.
23
 While deposit bailouts remain a central 
feature of our financial system, certain reform efforts have focused on lessening the like-
lihood of such bailouts by imposing heightened risk constraints on banks, including high-
er capital and stricter liquidity requirements.
24
 The Rule represented an additional effort 
at risk constraint, inspired perhaps by one of the most salient and troubling crisis events: 
                                                 
20
 “Banks” in this Article refers to deposit-taking institutions. “Broker-dealers” include the classic 
Wall Street firms (often called—perhaps confusingly—“investment banks”) involved in activities such as 
underwriting securities offerings, buying and selling securities on their own or clients’ accounts, and 
advising corporate clients on mergers and acquisitions. SIBs engage in both types of activity, but out of 
different subsidiaries.  
21
 See Title II Resolution Strategy Overview 14, Aug. 2012, 
https://www.fdic.gov/resauthority/sifiresolution.pdf. 
22
 See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 214, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 
5394).  
23
 This is, of course, deposit insurance. See Deposit Insurance at a Glance, FED. DEPOSIT INS. 
COMMISSION, https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/deposits/brochures/deposit_insurance_at_a_glance-
english.html.  
24
 See, e.g., Regulatory Capital Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 62018 (codified at 12 C.F.R. parts 208, 217, and 
225); Liquidity Coverage Ratio, 79 Fed. Reg. 61440 (codified at 12 C.F.R. parts 50, 249, and 329). 
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the bailout of the insurer AIG in September 2008.
25
 
II. The Rule’s Ineffectiveness as an Anti-Bailout Measure 
Critics suggest that the Rule protected taxpayers from paying for bank risk-
taking.
26
 Whether taxpayers are on the hook for a bailout, however, is unlikely to turn on 
whether a SIB books its swaps in its bank subsidiary or its broker-dealer subsidiary. The 
key conceptual assumption driving this Article is that for the largest financial institu-
tions—those that dominate the relevant swaps markets27—the relevant unit of analysis for 
thinking about potential taxpayer bailouts is the SIB as a whole, not its subsidiaries. 
If a SIB subsidiary is insolvent but the SIB as a whole is not, the SIB parent com-
pany will almost certainly recapitalize the subsidiary; it does not matter whether it is the 
commercial bank or the broker-dealer.
28
 If, on the other hand, the SIB as a whole is insol-
vent, the default option is to put it into bankruptcy. For the largest financial firms—those 
that dominate the relevant swap markets and that lobbied for the rollback of the Rule—
however, it is highly likely that regulators would instead resort to the Single Point Of En-
try (“SPOE”) strategy authorized by Title II of Dodd-Frank. The reason is straightfor-
                                                 
25
 AIG sold CDS on bonds backed by mortgages. These CDS were a bit like insurance: buyers 
promised to make periodic premium payments to AIG, and AIG promised to pay out on the CDS in the 
event the bond being “insured” suffered a defined “credit event,” such as a default. The CDS were unlike 
insurance, however, in that the “protection buyers” were largely taking speculative short positions rather 
than insuring against losses—they did not necessarily have an “insurable interest.” In addition, AIG was 
careful to structure the CDS so that they would not technically qualify as insurance contracts, which 
would have required AIG to set aside capital reserves against potential losses. In large part because of its 
failure to provide adequately for losses on its CDS portfolio, AIG required a massive bailout from the 
federal government. The Rule was intended to protect taxpayers from covering AIG-like losses at 
institutions whose creditors—i.e., depositors—continue to enjoy explicit federal insurance against losses. 
For an account of AIG’s bailout, see FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
REPORT, 19 (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf 
[hereinafter FCIC REPORT].  
26
 See, e.g., supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
27
 See supra note 9. 
28
 The holding company is legally required to support the bank subsidiary. Dodd-Frank Act § 616(d), 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. 1831o-1). The holding company is not legally required to recapitalize the broker-
dealer subsidiary, but failing to do so is likely to cause immense reputational damage to the SIB, and 
could constitute institutional suicide. See, e.g., Julie Creswell & Vikram Bajas, $3.2 Billion Move by Bear 
Stearns to Rescue Fund, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/23/business/23bond.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. It is important to 
note, of course, that there are strict limits on the holding company’s ability to shift resources from banks 
to other subsidiaries. See Federal Reserve Act § 23A (codified at 12 USC 371c). If a SIB that was solvent 
on a consolidated basis—due to a well-capitalized bank—were unable to support a non-bank subsidiary, it 
would likely trigger the SPOE resolution discussed in this section. 
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ward: SPOE resolution is much less likely to spark a panic than a bankruptcy proceed-
ing.
29
  
The SPOE approach takes advantage of the organizational structure of U.S. SIBs: 
as noted above, they tend to have a parent holding company that issues equity shares and 
long-term debt in public capital markets and an array of subsidiaries that carry out the 
SIBs’ actual operations.30 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s strategy under 
SPOE is to resolve only the holding company.
31
 If the approach works, the subsidiaries 
will be transferred en masse and without any hiccup to a “bridge” holding company.32 All 
SIB losses will be borne at the parent holding company level, by long-term debtors and 
shareholders; to ensure that there is enough loss-absorbing capacity at the parent holding 
company level, the Federal Reserve is preparing a rule that will require SIBs to issue a 
minimum amount of long-term holding-company debt as part of its “total loss-absorbing 
capital.”33 
If this strategy works, it should not matter which subsidiary has booked the SIB’s 
derivatives. To be concrete, the debate over the Rule concerns whether certain swaps will 
be booked at a SIB’s commercial bank subsidiary, or its broker-dealer subsidiary. In ei-
ther event, the subsidiaries will continue operating, and their third-party creditors and 
counterparties will suffer no losses or delays.
34
 Taxpayers will not be on the hook: all 
                                                 
29
 The failure of a SIB could trigger runs on sister SIBs if short-term creditors feel they are at risk of 
suffering delay and/or a haircut in recovering their principal. Preempting this dynamic requires meeting 
“no delay” and “no haircut” conditions for short-term creditors of a failed SIB. A SPOE resolution can 
plausibly meet these conditions, bankruptcy cannot. For a fuller discussion, see John Crawford, “Single 
Point of Entry”: The Promise and Limits of the Latest Cure for Bailouts, 109 NW L. REV. ONLINE 103 
(2014). 
30
 See Dodd-Frank Act Title II; see also Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions: 
The Single Point of Entry Strategy, 78 Fed. Reg. 76614, 76615 (proposed Dec. 18, 2013) [hereinafter 
Proposed SPOE Rule]. 
31
 Id. at 76615–17. 
32
 Id. The new “bridge” holding company would be structurally just like the old holding company, but 
with fewer obligations and different claimants. The old shareholders would likely be wiped out; the old 
long-term creditors would likely have their debt claims on the original holding company converted into 
equity claims on the new bridge holding company—almost certainly representing a significant diminution 
in value. The term “bridge” reflects the provisional status of the claims on the new holding company 
during the resolution process; the new holding company serves as a “bridge” between the pre-resolution 
SIB and the post-resolution SIB. 
33
 See FIN. STABILITY BD., ADEQUACY OF LOSS-ABSORBING CAPACITY OF GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY 
IMPORTANT BANKS IN RESOLUTION (2014), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-
content/uploads/TLAC-Condoc-6-Nov-2014-FINAL.pdf. 
34
 Traditional cross-default provisions in swaps could disrupt this strategy, but major swap dealers 
have adopted a protocol to opt into resolution regimes that override these cross-default provisions. See 
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losses will be borne by the long-term creditors and equity claimants of the SIB holding 
company. 
But what if there is insufficient capacity at the holding company level to absorb all 
the SIB’s losses in a resolution? The formal requirement in this case is to resolve the sub-
sidiaries that remain insolvent even after being recapitalized in the SPOE resolution pro-
cess.
35
 If regulators actually followed this approach, then in theory it could matter to tax-
payers which subsidiary was insolvent.
36
 However, we believe this scenario is unlikely. 
Required total loss-absorbing capacity at the holding company level is expected to be 
somewhere near 20% of risk-weighted assets. Should losses outstrip that amount, bank-
ing regulators will likely be more concerned about containing broader risks to the finan-
cial system than about imposing losses on subsidiary creditors. Resolving a SIB subsidi-
ary and giving its creditors haircuts can generate the precise crisis-like dynamics—panic 
and its pernicious consequences—that Title II is meant to help avoid.37 Regulators who 
invoke Title II will have strong incentives to prevent this outcome by effectively bailing 
out the SIB subsidiaries. 
Despite the formal prohibition on bailouts, Title II provides some latitude for regu-
lators to prevent contagion by engaging in a de facto bailout. If a newly capitalized SIB 
under a bridge holding company is facing a liquidity crunch, the Treasury is authorized to 
lend to the SIB.
38
 The SIB has to be solvent in order to receive such loans.
39
 The distinc-
tion between insolvency and illiquidity in a crisis can, however, be impossible to draw 
with confidence; it necessarily depends on a large number of assumptions, and a few op-
timistic (yet plausible) assumptions will often be enough to ground a solvency determina-
tion. If Treasury fails to recover its loans, it must impose an ex post levy on other SIBs, 
thus ensuring that taxpayers do not suffer losses.
40
 Again, in this scenario—which we 
                                                                                                                                                             
Resolution Stay Protocol – Background, ISDA (2014) 
https://www2.isda.org/attachment/NzA0Mw==/RESOLUTION%20STAY%20PROTOCOL%20Backgro
und%20FINAL.pdf. 
35
 See Proposed SPOE Rule, supra note 32, at 76623. 
36
 It is possible that the government would be legally obligated to cover (some) losses at the bank if 
(i) the bank’s losses outstripped all the bank’s uninsured liabilities—otherwise, the uninsured depositors 
and bond holders could absorb all losses—and (ii) losses on insured deposits outstripped the funds 
available from the Federal Deposit Insurance Fund, which is capitalized by industry fees rather than 
taxpayer dollars. The government would be under no legal obligation to cover losses at the broker-dealer. 
37
 Panic is a phenomenon that affects short-term funding; short-term funding is used by SIB 
subsidiaries but generally not the SIB holding company. 
38
 Id. at 76616. 
39
 Id. 
40
 Id. at 76617. The “ex post levy” means that the government will collect any money it loses on the 
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consider the likeliest in the event a SIB fails and its losses do, in fact, outstrip the loss ab-
sorbing capacity of the parent holding company—it should not matter ex post whether the 
swaps were booked at the bank or the broker-dealer. 
III. What Is at Stake for SIBs?  
If the controversy surrounding the Rule’s rollback focused erroneously on the like-
lihood of bailouts of SIB subsidiaries, then the question remains why the big banks cared 
about the issue. What factors made it important enough for SIBs to lobby against the 
Rule? Below, we look at several possibilities, considering transition costs and collateral 
before zeroing in on capital as what is likely of greatest concern to the SIBs. 
A. Transition costs  
One possibility is that there may be transition costs related to things such as re-
writing contracts. These one-time costs may be substantial in the short-term, but in the 
long-term would likely be relatively small and should not be a major concern from a pub-
lic policy perspective.  
B. Collateral 
Another potential motivation relates to collateral requirements. Collateral is secu-
rity against the future performance under a contract. In a CDS transaction, the contract is 
executory: both parties have yet to fully perform. Here it will help to provide a stylized 
example of a CDS for illustrative purposes.  
Figure 2: 10-year CDS on Inc. Bonds 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
loans it makes to the bridge holding company through a fee or tax on remaining SIBs. 
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Figure 2 illustrates the structure of a typical CDS: a SIB (“Big SIB”) sells $10 mil-
lion worth of protection to a hedge fund (“Hedgie”) against default by a corporate bond 
issuer (“Inc.”).41 The CDS has a duration of 10 years, and to purchase the protection, 
Hedgie agrees to pay $125,000 per quarter to Big SIB.
42
 
By construction, the CDS will be valued at zero at inception. This means that the 
expected present value of Hedgie’s premium payments to Big SIB perfectly offsets the 
expected present value of Big SIB’s contingent payment to Hedgie in the event of Inc.’s 
default.
43
 As Inc.’s creditworthiness and other market conditions change over the life of 
the CDS, however, the value of the contract is unlikely to remain at zero. If, for example, 
the cost of buying $10 million worth of protection against Inc.’s default rises to $250,000 
per quarter, then a default by Big SIB would impose a significant “replacement” cost on 
Hedgie: Hedgie would have to pay twice as much for the same level of protection with 
another dealer. If, on the other hand, the cost of buying $10 million worth of protection 
fell to $62,500 per quarter, then Hedgie’s default on its premium payments would be 
costly to Big SIB: Big SIB would have to take on twice the risk, guaranteeing $20 million 
worth of Inc.’s bonds, in order to replace the revenue stream it lost from Hedgie. Each 
party’s cost of replacing the position in the event of counterparty default is referred to as 
“current exposure,” and parties may post collateral as security for these replacement 
costs.
44
  
Parties may also post collateral for “potential future exposure,” which reflects fac-
                                                 
41
 It is important to note that the $10 million is notional: it does not actually change hands upfront. 
42
 This represents a cost of protection of 500 basis points, or 5% per annum: four annual payments of 
$125,000 equals $500,000 per year, or 5% of $10 million. 
43
 This assumption is stylized for ease of analysis; the reality is usually a bit more complicated. See, 
e.g., David Mengle, The Value of a New Swap, ISDA RES. NOTES (2010), 
http://www.isda.org/researchnotes/pdf/NewSwapRN.pdf (“The pricing of derivatives transactions is based 
on the theoretical concept of pricing at mid-market, that is, zero net present value at inception. In practice, 
the mid-market price is generally not the actual price transacted with a counterparty, but is instead a 
benchmark against which the actual price is set.”). In general, the divergence from zero is likely to be 
small. Id. at 2, note 1 (“The small initial divergence from par is the dealer’s profit on making the 
market.”). A notable counter-example of a large divergence involved a derivative transaction in 2006 
between the government of Greece and Goldman Sachs. The deal was struck “off-market” such that 
Greece’s day one position on the transaction was significantly negative. In return, Goldman Sachs made a 
substantial upfront payment to Greece, which had the effect of making the Greek government’s fiscal 
position look healthier than it was. This transaction was, however, unusual.   
44
 Collateral posted to cover current exposure, or the cost of replacing the position, is referred to as 
“variation margin.” See Capital, Margin, and Segregation Requirements for Security-Based Swap Dealers 
and Major Security-Based Swap Participants and Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers, 77 Fed. Reg. 
70214, 70257 n.475 (proposed Nov. 23, 2012) [hereinafter Proposed Capital Rule] (“In the Dodd-Frank 
Act, collateral collected to cover current exposure is referred to as variation margin.”). 
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tors such as the volatility of Inc.’s bond spreads and counterparty creditworthiness.45 The 
parties will generally use credit ratings as a proxy for creditworthiness.
46
 Because of the 
interplay between credit ratings and collateral requirements, the entity in which a CDS 
transaction is booked can have a substantial impact on a broker-dealer’s profit margin. If 
there is a difference in the credit ratings assigned to a SIB’s broker-dealer subsidiary and 
its bank subsidiary, then the SIB will, all else equal, have an incentive to book derivatives 
at the higher-rated subsidiary. Higher credit ratings will generally translate into lower col-
lateral requirements, which effectively lower the cost of the transaction. Some news re-
ports cited this as a motivating factor behind SIBs’ lobbying for the Rule’s rollback.47 
However, if our analysis of the likely fallout from SIB failure is correct, then the 
credit ratings of the bank and broker-dealer subsidiaries—which relate to uninsured debt 
such as long-term bonds—should generally be the same.48 And indeed, there is no differ-
ence between the credit rating on long-term debt at the broker-dealer and commercial 
bank subsidiaries for four of the five SIBs that, in aggregate, account for 95% of total no-
                                                 
45
 See id. at 70241 (“[P]otential future exposure” covers “the risk, among other things, . . . that the 
current exposure may increase in the future and the counterparty will default on the obligation to provide 
additional collateral to cover the increase . . . .”). In practice, of course, the parties will generally net out 
both their current and potential future exposure in posting collateral. See, e.g., id. at 70243 (“For internal 
risk management purposes, the ANC broker-dealer monitors and controls its exposure to the counterparty 
on a net basis.”). Parties will typically net out their obligations across all derivatives contracts they have 
entered with each other. It is worth noting that prior to the financial crisis, parties were generally not 
required to collateralize these counterparty credit risks. However, even in that period, as market 
conditions and the creditworthiness of the counterparties changed, the parties would often exchange 
collateral to account for these shifts. Following passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, and corresponding 
enactment of similar measures in Europe and Asia-Pacific, most transactions require financial parties to 
collateralize their transactions. 
46
 Collateral terms between two counterparties for swaps are set forth by the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA) in a document known as the Credit Support Annex. The specific terms 
can be customized, but the form is standard across the industry. Credit ratings are a typical factor in 
determining the amount of collateral that counterparties must post under different scenarios, given that 
current exposure and potential future exposure are essentially other forms of the extension of credit. As 
such, a party to a CDS will generally have to post more collateral the lower its credit rating. Assets posted 
as collateral translate to less funding for other productive and profitable purposes. 
47
 See Carney, supra note 9. The SIB’s counterparty will often be a smaller bank, and Carney astutely 
observes that the smaller bank may itself be required to take a higher capital charge the lower the SIB’s 
credit rating due to heightened counterparty risk, and that this will affect pricing adversely for the SIB. Id. 
Of course, if the position is fully collateralized, it will not require a higher capital charge for the small 
bank, but either way, the small bank will demand more generous terms from the SIB, cutting into the 
SIB’s profit margin. 
48
 This is because there is little practical difference in the likelihood of default by different SIB 
subsidiaries, given the realities of Title II. 
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tional derivatives in the United States.
49
 The broker-dealers and commercial banks of, re-
spectively, JPMorgan Chase & Co., Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Bank of America Corpo-
ration, and Morgan Stanley, have received the same ratings from every credit ratings 
agency that has rated both.
50
 Again, this is consistent with the discussion above suggest-
ing that the probability of default on uninsured debt is likely not higher in a SIB’s non-
bank subsidiaries than in its bank. There is one outlier: for Citigroup Inc., Moody’s rating 
for the broker-dealer is three notches below that of the bank; and S&P’s and Fitch’s re-
spective ratings for the broker-dealer are one notch below their ratings for the bank.
51
 We 
find this somewhat puzzling, given the realities of Title II. In any event, it was reported 
that Citigroup was particularly active in seeking the rollback of the Rule, and the impact 
of credit ratings on its collateral requirements may help (partly) explain Citigroup’s moti-
vation, though it does not explain the motivations of other SIBs.
52
  
C. Capital 
While transition costs and collateral concerns may have played some role in SIB 
lobbying for the rollback, we believe the central motivation was much simpler: a desire 
for more favorable capital treatment. What counts as “capital” for regulatory purposes 
can be extraordinarily complicated in operational terms but is simple at a conceptual lev-
el: it is a measure of the difference between a bank’s assets and its liabilities, between 
what it owns and what it owes. A larger capital buffer makes default—that is, failing to 
pay what is owed—less likely, holding all else equal.  
Why, then, might SIB decision-makers want to minimize capital? The key reason 
                                                 
49
 See Carney, supra note 9. JPMorgan Chase & Co. alone accounts for 44% of credit default swaps. 
50
 The relevant credit rating for derivatives purposes is the rating on long-term debt. See JPMorgan 
Chase & Co., Fixed Income Information: Credit Ratings, 
http://investor.shareholder.com/JPMorganChase/fixedIncome.cfm (comparing JPMorgan Chase Bank, 
N.A. to J.P. Morgan Securities LLC); Goldman Sachs Credit Ratings, 
http://www.goldmansachs.com/investor-relations/creditor-information/gs-entity-rating.pdf (comparing 
Goldman Sachs & Co. to Goldman Sachs Bank USA); Bank of America, Fixed Income Overview: Credit 
Ratings Summary, 
http://investor.bankofamerica.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=71595&p=debtoverview#fbid=nfXFTZgx57A 
(comparing Bank of America, N.A. to Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated); Morgan 
Stanley Investor Relations, Creditor Information: Current Credit Ratings, 
https://www.morganstanley.com/about-us-ir/creditor-presentations.html (comparing Morgan Stanley 
Bank, N.A., to Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC). 
51
 Citigroup Credit Ratings, http://www.citigroup.com/citi/investor/rate.htm (comparing Citibank, 
N.A., to Citigroup Global Markets Holdings Inc.). 
52
 See Carney, supra note 9 (noting that the provision rolling back the Rule “was reportedly authored 
by lobbyists for Citigroup,” but “J.P. Morgan Chase chief Jamie Dimon [also] called to lobby 
lawmakers”).  
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is that if one holds equity constant, then taking on more debt—which translates to a thin-
ner capital buffer in relative terms—can amplify the returns on equity (i.e., shareholder 
profits). This holds true as long as the return on assets—e.g., the interest on the loans the 
SIB makes to others—exceeds the interest the SIB pays to its lenders. In contrast, having 
to fund a business with more capital depresses a SIB’s return on equity. As a result, SIB 
decision-makers tend to view capital as an “expensive” way to fund the SIB’s activities, 
and thus have an incentive to minimize it.
53
 
The bank capital regime is very different in its details from the “net capital” rules 
that apply to broker-dealers.
54
 In many cases, but not all, the same position (such as con-
tractual rights and obligations under a swap contract) will draw a larger capital require-
ment at a bank than at a broker-dealer. One might think that the SIB would want to book 
as many of these positions as possible at the broker-dealer instead of the bank. However, 
SIBs must apply bank capital rules on a consolidated basis throughout the entire holding 
company family, so that for most practical purposes the SIB cannot escape bank capital 
rules by parking assets at its non-bank subsidiaries. In contrast to positions where the 
bank capital charge exceeds the net capital charge, uncleared derivatives represent one 
limited subset of interests where the capital requirement at the broker-dealer, all else 
equal, may exceed the capital requirement for the same position at the bank.
55
 This is es-
pecially the case under a new rule proposed, but not yet finalized, by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission.
56
 It is our view that this was the most significant factor driving 
efforts to roll back the Rule.  
To illustrate this, we will draw on the hypothetical CDS between Big SIB and 
Hedgie outlined above in Figure 2.
57
 Assume the following two stylized facts: (1) the 
                                                 
53
 There are strong critics of banks’ claim that “capital is expensive.” See generally Anat R. Admati et 
al., Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is 
Not Socially Expensive (Stanford Graduate Sch. of Bus. Research Paper No. 13-7, 2013). These critics 
argue that capital is expensive relative to debt only because of social subsidies such as implicit 
government guarantees of the largest financial institutions and the deductibility of interest payments (but 
not dividends). Id. They do not, however, question that capital can be at least privately expensive for 
SIBs, thus creating the incentive to minimize it. 
54
 We will assume that the relevant choice of subsidiaries for the SIB is either a bank or a broker-
dealer, but it is worth noting that any non-bank entity dealing in swaps will face capital requirements that 
are largely identical to those applying to broker-dealers. See Proposed Capital Rule, supra note 46. 
55
 Unlike bank capital requirements that apply on a consolidated basis to the entire SIB, the net capital 
requirements apply only to the broker-dealer.  
56
 Proposed Capital Rule, supra note 46. 
57
 To be clear, for the purposes of this Article we use a highly simplified example and ignore a number 
of factors related to how precise capital requirements for a broker-dealer or bank would be calculated. 
These simplifying steps are adopted as a matter of convenience and do not affect our ultimate 
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contract is struck with a value of zero at inception; and (2) Big SIB is precisely at its reg-
ulatory thresholds with respect to its bank capital, consolidated bank capital, and net capi-
tal requirements.  
The CDS will require Big SIB to raise extra capital no matter where it is booked, 
but the swap will require Big SIB to raise more new capital under the SEC’s proposed net 
capital rule than under bank capital rules.
58
 Both capital regimes—net capital and bank 
capital—require two calculations: (i) required capital and (ii) actual capital. Compliance 
demands that actual capital be greater than or equal to required capital (assumption (2) in 
the paragraph above means that the two are equal at Big SIB). If required capital goes up, 
or if actual capital goes down, Big SIB will have to raise new capital.  
Consider first bank capital. As noted, at a high level, capital measures the differ-
ence between assets and liabilities. Because the contract is valued at zero, the swap leaves 
actual capital unchanged. The swap adds to the bank’s required capital levels, however: it 
must treat its exposure to the underlying reference asset—Inc.’s bonds—as if it had 
loaned cash to Inc. directly.
59
 The $10 million exposure would receive a 100% risk 
weight,
60
 and under rules being implemented now, a total capital charge of up to 15% 
                                                                                                                                                             
conclusion—that capital requirements for a given credit derivatives transaction booked at a broker-dealer 
would be higher than they would be if the positions were booked at a depository institution. 
58
 It is important to emphasize that different assumptions will yield different results. In some cases, 
the net capital charge may be even greater than the bank capital charge; in others, bank capital will 
exceed net capital requirements. Our goal here is not to map out the relative capital charges under a wide 
range of scenarios, but simply to illustrate how the net capital charge can, under plausible assumptions, 
prove more onerous.  
59
 12 C.F.R. 3.34(c)(2) (“A national bank or Federal savings association that is the protection provider 
under an OTC credit derivative must treat the OTC credit derivative as an exposure to the underlying 
reference asset.”). Counterparty credit risk need not affect capital requirements for the bank as protection 
seller, and we assume for ease of exposition that it does not here. See id. (“The national bank or Federal 
savings association is not required to compute a counterparty credit risk capital requirement for the OTC 
credit derivative under § 3.32, provided that this treatment is applied consistently for all such OTC credit 
derivatives.”). Collateral also does not generally affect capital for the bank as posted collateral remains on 
the balance sheet of the bank and received collateral is segregated so it does not appear on the bank’s 
balance sheet. The treatment of collateral for broker-dealers is different. See infra note 77. 
60
 See 12 C.F.R. 3.32(f) (“A national bank . . . must assign a 100% risk weight to all its corporate 
exposures.”). Risk weights are a way of adjusting required capital to the perceived riskiness of a bank’s 
assets. In this example, where the capital requirement is 15%, infra note 61, a 100% risk weight means 
that the bank has to apply the 15% capital requirement to the full face value of the position. A 50% risk 
weight would mean that the bank would apply the 15% capital charge to 50% of the face value of the 
position, effectively halving the required capital. And if the risk weight were zero—as with Treasury 
bonds, the traditional paragon of a “safe” investment—it would mean that there would not be a capital 
charge at all for the position. 
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would apply.
61
 If the swap is booked in the bank, then, Big SIB will have to add as much 
as $1.5 million in capital to cover the position. 
What about broker-dealers’ net capital? For broker-dealers that carry customer ac-
counts which include all the largest broker-dealers, required net capital is computed as a 
percentage of customer debits.
62
 Let us assume Hedgie is not a customer; the swap would 
then not add to Big SIB’s required net capital.63   
The swap would, however, have an impact on Big SIB’s actual net capital: it 
would reduce actual net capital, meaning Big SIB would have to raise new capital to cov-
er the shortfall. Actual net capital is calculated by computing a broker-dealer’s net worth 
and then making a number of adjustments, including deductions for various assets based 
on perceived risk.
64
 The swap, valued at zero, would not add to the broker-dealer’s net 
worth, but would require new deductions. Under the rules that apply to Big SIB’s broker-
dealer subsidiary,
65
 the swap will require (1) a “market risk” deduction to account for the 
possibility that Big SIB will lose on the position due to Inc.’s performance or other mar-
ket factors; and (2) a “credit risk” deduction to account for counterparty risk vis-à-vis 
Hedgie.
66
 We consider the effect of each type of deduction in turn. 
1. Market Risk  
The largest broker-dealers, including the broker-dealer subsidiaries of the SIBs af-
fected most by the Rule and its rollback, use “alternative net capital” (ANC) rules that 
permit them to use their own internal financial models rather than mandatory haircuts to 
compute the necessary market risk deductions.
67
 These models are visible to regulators 
                                                 
61
 Under rules that will come fully into effect at the beginning of 2019, all banks are subject to capital 
requirements—consisting of a “minimum total capital ratio” plus a “capital conservation buffer,” and 
expressed as a percentage of risk-weighted assets—of 10.5%. See Regulatory Capital Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 
62018, 62075 at tables 5 & 6 (Oct. 11, 2013). In addition, the largest SIBs will be subject to an additional 
SIB capital “surcharge” of up to 4.5 percentage points. See Board of Governors for the Federal Reserve 
System, Press Release, July 20, 2015, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20150720a.htm (“[E]stimated surcharges . . . 
range from 1.0 to 4.5% of each firm's total risk-weighted assets.”). 
62
 17 C.F.R. 240.15c3-1(a)(1)(ii).  
63
 If Hedgie is a customer, then Big SIB’s broker-dealer could face even higher capital requirements, 
as required net capital would rise as a result of any collateral that Hedgie posted with the broker-dealer 
(since such collateral would constitute customer debits).  
64
 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(2) (2015). 
65
 See infra note 67 and accompanying text. 
66
 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1e(b) & (c) (2015). 
67
 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1e (2015). See also Removal of Certain References to Credit Ratings Under 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 79 Fed. Reg. 1522, 1532 n.162 (Jan. 8, 2014) (“Currently, there are 
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but not to the general public. When the SEC proposed the rule permitting the use of in-
ternal models in 2004, however, it estimated the ANC rules would reduce deductions for 
broker-dealers by an average of 40%.
68
 We may, then, be able to get a very rough esti-
mate of the market risk deduction that would apply to Big SIB’s net capital if it booked 
the swap at its broker-dealer by calculating the mandatory deduction under the new rule 
and applying a 40% discount. Under the new rule, the mandatory deduction for the swap 
will be 25% of the notional value of the position,
69
 or $2.5 million.
70
 Applying a 40% dis-
count as a rough proxy for the effect of Big SIB’s ability to use internal models, this 
would translate to a $1.5 million market risk deduction—as a practical matter, $1.5 mil-
lion of additional capital that the broker-dealer will have to raise. As described below, 
however, several factors beyond the market risk deduction could have the effect of in-
creasing the net capital charge for the position—potentially to much more than $1.5 mil-
lion. 
2. Credit risk and collateral  
Assume first that the position is fully collateralized on a net basis.
71
 If Big SIB 
ends up having to post collateral with Hedgie, this collateral will count as an unsecured 
receivable which receives a 100% capital deduction under proposed rules.
72
 This would, 
of course, create a significant capital charge if the market moved against Big SIB’s posi-
tion. For example, if Inc.’s creditworthiness deteriorated one year after our illustrative 
CDS was struck, so that the cost of attaining the same level of insurance rose to $175,000 
per quarter, then Hedgie’s current exposure to Big SIB—reflecting the replacement cost 
of the contract if Big SIB defaulted—would be very large: assuming a 5% annual dis-
count rate, it would rise to approximately $1.44 million.
73
 If Big SIB’s broker-dealer 
                                                                                                                                                             
six ANC broker-dealers: Barclays Capital Inc.; Citigroup Global Markets, Inc.; Goldman Sachs & Co.; 
J.P. Morgan Chase Securities LLC; Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Incorporated; and Morgan 
Stanley & Co. Incorporated.”). 
68
 See Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers that are Part of Consolidated 
Supervised Entities, 69 Fed. Reg. 34428, 34455 (“In the Proposing Release, we estimated that broker-
dealers taking advantage of the alternative capital computation would realize an average reduction in 
capital deductions of approximately 40%.”). 
69
 See Proposed Capital Rule, supra note 46, at 70335. The market deduction for the protection seller 
in a CDS is determined by length to maturity and the basis point spread (that is, the premium paid by the 
protection buyer). The rule requires a deduction of 25% of the notional amount of protection for 10-year 
contracts with a 500 basis point spread (as in our example with Big SIB and Hedgie).  
70
 The notional value is $10 million; $10 million x 25% = $2.5 million. 
71
 This means that, after netting, the party with current or potential future exposure to the other party 
receives collateral to cover the entire (net) exposure. 
72
 See Proposed Capital Rule, supra note 46, at 70241. 
73
 Again, this is an estimate for purposes of the stylized example; the replacement cost—i.e., the 
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posted this as collateral, it would almost double the capital charge from $1.5 million to 
$2.94 million.
74
 
It is also worth noting that the proposed rules for broker-dealers do not require that 
their own (net) exposure to swap counterparties be fully collateralized; if, however, the 
counterparty is a financial entity such as Hedgie, the broker-dealer’s unsecured exposure 
also receives a 100% deduction.
75
 Thus, if Inc.’s creditworthiness improves instead of de-
teriorates, but Hedgie does not post collateral, the credit risk deduction could make Big 
SIB’s net capital charge just as onerous. 
In any event, booking this swap in the broker-dealer will often require Big SIB to 
raise more—perhaps considerably more—new capital than it would have to raise if the 
swap were booked in the commercial bank. It is worth emphasizing again that changing 
the assumptions could radically change this outcome. The point of the example is to show 
that the net capital charge can be significantly greater than the bank capital charge, and 
SIBs have an incentive to maintain flexibility in where they book a swap in order to min-
imize the capital charge that applies to it. The Rule would have forced SIBs to book 
swaps where they would often require a larger capital charge; this is the principal reason 
SIBs pushed for the Rule’s rollback.  
IV. Conclusion 
Despite critics’ claims in the wake of the rollback,76 the Rule was oversold as an 
                                                                                                                                                             
current exposure that needs to be collateralized—should be calculable based on the present value of the 
difference between the stream of the premium payments Hedgie is currently making and the stream of 
premium payments it would have to make if it struck a new contract for the same degree of protection. 
This would presumably be discounted by some estimate of the likelihood that the premium payments will 
stop due to Inc.’s default, but we ignore this to keep the example (relatively) simple. Under these 
assumptions, current exposure can be determined by the equation , where CE = current 
exposure; D = the difference between the periodic (quarterly) payment, i.e., $175,000 minus $125,000, or 
$50,000; i = the discount rate, i.e., 1.25% per quarter (equivalent to 5% per annum); and n = the number 
of quarterly payments, i.e., 36, as one year has elapsed and there are nine years left on the original CDS. 
74
 Big_SIB’s bank would have to post the same collateral, but it would not have to take a capital 
deduction for it. 
75
 See Proposed Capital Rule, supra note 46, at 70241. 
76
 See, e.g., supra note 5; see also Emily Stephenson & Sarah N. Lynch, Sen. Feinstein working to 
reinstate U.S. swaps ‘push-out’ rule, REUTERS, Feb. 6, 2015, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/06/usa-congress-swaps-idUSL1N0VG26G20150206 (Senator 
Diane Feinstein stated she was “appalled that we are again opening the door to the trading of risky 
derivatives backed by a taxpayer guarantee.”); Heidi Moore, Congressional budget welcomes big bank 
bailouts once more despite White House opposition, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 10, 2014, 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/dec/10/congressional-budget-big-bank-bailouts (Dennis 
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anti-bailout measure. If swaps give rise to negative externalities by increasing the risk of 
taxpayer bailouts, there are at least two ways to mitigate the cost: prohibition and forcing 
dealers to internalize more of the risk through higher capital requirements. The Rule was 
unsatisfying on either measure. For those in favor of prohibition, our analysis suggests 
that the Rule would have been ineffective as a way to protect taxpayers from risks arising 
from swaps dealing. An effective rule from this point of view would push the swaps out 
of the entire SIB holding company family, as the Volcker Rule does for proprietary trad-
ing.
77
 
Higher capital requirements, on the other hand, are a standard prudential regulato-
ry tool for mitigating risk. Requirements vary, depending on the type of legal entity in 
which a particular transaction is booked. Such variances drive much behavior for SIBs 
and it may be appropriate to harmonize these requirements across the various types of le-
gal entities. In any event, those who believe swaps pose substantial risks, but who hesi-
tate from calling for a SIB-wide prohibition, should focus on capital. The Rule may, as a 
practical matter, have achieved higher capital as a side effect, but it would have done so 
in an inefficient and opaque manner. If legislators or regulators believe capital require-
ments should be higher, they should raise them directly. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Kelleher, president of Wall Street watchdog Better Markets, claimed the Rule “was saying US taxpayers 
should not be paying for risky trading activities.”). 
77
 This may be the appropriate approach if, contrary to the current market configuration, swaps 
dealing becomes a large and widespread problem among non-SIB banks. On the other hand, such a move 
might prove counterproductive if it pushed systemically risky activities into unregulated corners of the 
market. See, e.g., Cheyenne Hopkins & Silla Bush, Dodd-Frank Swaps Pushout Would Be Eased by 
Bipartisan Bills, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS, (Mar. 6, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-
03-06/dodd-frank-swap-pushout-would-be-limited-under-bipartisan-bills (“Fed Chairman Ben S. 
Bernanke and Sheila Bair, the former Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. chairman, opposed the provision 
and argued that it would drive derivatives trading to less-regulated entities.”). 
